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FINANCING THEORIES AND FINANCING PRACTICES: A CASE 
STUDY OF TWO CASINO COMPANIES 
Zheng Gu 
and 
Jolan Ku 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the financing behaviors of two major casino companies, 
Mirage Resorts, Inc., and Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., in their recent expansion 
projects. It compares the two companies' financing practices with the three existing 
financing theories, namely the traditional trade-off theory, the pure pecking order 
theory, and the modified pecking order theory. It appears that the modified pecking 
order theory can best describe the two companies' financing behaviors. 
Introduction 
In corporate finance, what determines the corporate capital structure decision, or the 
decision about the mix of financing sources, remains an issue without a consensus. Myers 
(1984) examined the two existing theories about corporate financing, the traditional trade- 
off (TTO) theory and the pure pecking order (PPO) theory. Myers found that both failed 
to explain corporate financing behavior satisfactorily Attempting to solve the capital 
structure puzzle, Myers proposed what he termed "the modified pecking order" (MPO) 
financingtheory. Therefore, there are at least three theories explaining corporate financing 
behavior. 
Andrew and Schmidgall(1993) have pointed out that the two areas of financial man- 
agement that concern hospitality managers most are the investment decision and the fi- 
nancing or capital structure decision. Capital structure has a direct impact on the cost of 
capital and hence on the value of the firm. In hospitality research, nonetheless, capital 
stkcture has been insufficiently covered. The studies on hotel capital structure determi- 
nants by Kwansa, Johnson, and Olsen (1987) and Sheel (1994); the research on restaurant 
debt financing by Gu (1993); and a comparison of the capital structure of the hotel industry 
with those of three slow-growing industries by Gu (1996) are the few documented studies 
in the area. 
The rapid expansion of the gaming industry in recent years has made casino financing 
mix or capital structure an issue of growing importance. There is, however, a lack of aca- 
demic studies on the capital structure of casino firms. This paper analyzes the financing 
practices of two major casino companies, Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc., and Mirage Re- 
sorts, Inc., in their recent expansion projects. Comparing the two companies' financing be- 
haviors with the three existing financing theories, the study attempts to idenbfy the theory 
that can best describe casino financing behavior in reality. The two expansion projects ana- 
lyzed in this study are the two newly constructed casino megaresorts, " Luxor" of Circus 
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Circus and "Treasure Island" of Mirage. Both are located in Las Vegas, Nevada, and were 
launched into operation in December 1993. 
Financing theory is a positive theory that explains how a firm's financing policy is de- 
termined. It is not a normative theory that would advise what a firm's financing policy 
should be. The study is not designed to provide any policy guideline for casino firms. The 
study attempts to find, among the three existing financing theories, the theory that can best 
explain corporate financing behavior in practice. The purpose of the study is to help hos- 
pitality educators and researchers better understand casino firms' financing decision mak- 
ing. Many casino expansion projects have been completed during the recent gaming boom, 
providing us with good examples of casino financing. Comparing the financing theories 
with actual corporate financing behaviors, the study can provide real-world evidence for 
the theories. 
Review of the Three Financing Theories 
The capital structure irrelevance theory proposed by Modighani and Miller (1963) 
holds that a firm's value is not affected by its capital structure. The theory, however, was 
proposed under some strid assumptions, such as frictionless markets, no tax, no bank- 
ruptcy costs, and no growth. On the other hand, the 'IT0 theory of capital structure recog- 
nizes taxes and bankruptcies. The essence of the TTO is that a firm's debt-equity decision is 
based on the trade-off between the debt's tax shield and the costs associated with bank- 
ruptcy and financial distress (Robichek & Myers, 1966; Marsh, 1982). According to the 'ITO, 
the firm sets an optimal target debt-to-equity ratio at which the marginal costs and mar- 
ginal benefits of debt exactly offset each other. The firm will gradually move toward the 
target ratio. Typically, the target debt-equity ratio varies across firms. Companies with 
plenty of taxable income to shield tend to have high debt-equity ratios. Unprofitable com- 
panies may want to rely more on equity financing. Empirical studies attempting to find the 
determinants of capital structure within the trade-off frameworkindude those by Fem and 
Jones (1979), March (1982), and Castanias (1983). Bradley et al. (1984) provided an overall 
review of the 'IT0 theory and empirical studies. The problem with the TTO theory, as Brea- 
ley and Myers (1984) pointed out, is that the theory cannot explain the real-life capital struc- 
ture phenomenon that the most profitable companies generally thrive with little debt. 
Donaldson (1961 & 1969) discussed the principles of the PPO financing theory. The es- 
sence of the theory is that a firm follows a pecking-order of preference when making deci- 
sions on sources of capital. According to the PPO, internally generated funds are the most 
preferred, followed by debt if external financing is required. New equity is the last source 
for financing consideration. There is no well-defined target debt-equity ratio in the PPO. A 
firm's preference for internal financing, as Donaldson pointed out (1961), is due to its man- 
agement's unwillingness to be subjected to market scrutiny when raising funds on the capi- 
tal market. Donaldson (1961) observed that managers strongly favored internal generation 
as a source of new funds even to the exclusion of external funds, except for occasional 
unfavorable 'bulges' in the need for funds. He pointed out that if external financing was 
needed, managers rarely thought of issuing common stocks. Baskin (1989) tested the PPO 
by analyzing the debt ratios of sample firms and their relationship to past profitability. His 
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results supported the hypothesis that firms with higher past profitability use less debt 
financing. 
Myers (1984) modified the PPO theory and proposed what he called "the Modified 
Pecking Order" financing theory. In the MPO, the preference order of financing sources is 
the same as in the PPO, except that safe debt is preferred to risky debt. The MPO theory 
differs from the PPO theory on two major issues. First, the MPO suggests that information 
asymmetry, rather than the management's unwillingness to accept market scrutiny, deter- 
mines managers' preference for internal financing. Information asymmetry refers to the 
market's lack of understanding of the true value of a firm's investment opportunities when 
the ikn issues new securities to finance investment projects (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The 
consequence is the undervaluation of the security and therefore the undervaluation of the 
firm. The likelihood of undervaluation is related to the riskiness of the security to be is- 
sued. The riskier the security, the more likely it is that the market will undervalue the firm. 
While using internally generated funds can enable a firm to avoid such undervaluation, 
issuing less risky securities can reduce the undervaluation. As common stock is the most 
risky security for outside investors, new stock issuance is most likely to cause undervalua- 
tion. Therefore, in the MPO, internally generated funds are the most preferred, followed by 
safe debt, risky debt, and finally new equity. 
Second, the preference of debt to equity in the MPO theory is reversible. The MPO em- 
phasizes not only information asymmetry but also a firm's preference for "financial slack 
or debt capacity. The firm may reverse the order when its preference for reserving borrow- 
ing capacity prevails. Therefore, the firm may move back on the preference order and issue 
new equity, instead of debt, to maintain or increase financial slack. 
In an empirical study, Gu (1996) compared the capital structure of the hotel industry 
with those of three slow-growing industries: the petroleum and coal products industry, the 
apparel and textile industry, and the fabricated material products industry. Different lever- 
age ratios were used for the comparison. The results supported the MPO theory. 
Operating Features of Casino Firms 
The entertainment nature of the casino industry may make the revenues of casino ho- 
tels more volatile than those of regular hotels. The casino industry relies more on people's 
discretionary income than the hotel industry, which caters to a mix of business and plea- 
( sure travelers. A negative economic event, such as high inflation that reduces people's real 
'* income, may inflict a greater impact on casino revenues. The higher risk of the casino in- 
I 
t dustry was evidenced by its greater beta. According to the financial database of Prodigy 
i (1994), at the end of 1994, the average beta of the casino industry was 1.22, compared with 
I 
f the hotel industry's average of 0.79. In the meantime, the casino industry was less lever- 
i aged, with an average debt to equity ratio of 0.88, compared with the hotel industry's 1.45. 
! Obviously, the casino industry's greater covariance with the capital market was mainly 
F i due to its operational features, rather than its financing features. 
r 
The products of the casino industry are risky games. Within the casino industry, casi- 
nos offering high-limit games may have more volatile revenues than those offering only 
t 
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low-limit games because of windfall wins and losses. MGM Grand, Inc., which owns and 
operates MGM Casino in Las Vegas, had an operating loss in the second quarter of 1995, 
partly due to a one-night blackjack loss of $20 million to Keny Packer, an Australian high 
roller (MGM Grand, Inc., 1995). Caesars World, Inc., which operated Caesars Palace, 
another giant casino resort featuring high-limit games in Las Vegas, had negative earnings 
in summer 1994 because of big losses to Asian high rollers (Caesars World, Inc., 1994). 
The operation features of casinos imply that the operating cash flows (OCF) of casino 
firms, and those of high-limit casinos in particular, may be less stable in comparison with 
those of regular hotel firms. Therefore, a casino firm has to be very cautious if it decides to 
finance an expansion project with its OCF. A casino firm catering to high rollers is less 
likely to rely on internally generated cash flow to finance expansion than a casino featuring 
low-limit games. 
The Financing of Circus Circus' "Luxor" Casino ~ o t e l l  
The "Luxor" project of Circus Circus, Inc., a casino company whose casinos typically 
cater to low-wager gamblers, is a 30-story pyramid-shaped casino hotel with 2,500 rooms. 
The construction cost was estimated at $300 million. The project was announced in No- 
vember 1991 and was started in early 1992. By the end of 1991, prior to the construction, the 
company had the following financing options for the project. 
First, the company could use its internally generated 00. The company had paid no div- 
idend in the past. All the earnings had been retained for intemal-financing. Its OCF in 1991, 
calculated as its net income plus depreciation and amortization, totaled $151.12 million 
The company's earnings and OCF in the previous years (1981-1991) demonstrated a 
pattern of steady increase (see Table I), except for a slight dip in EPS in 1986. Its OCF had 
grown at an average annual rate of 21.7% in the previous 11 years. The steady growth of the 
earnings and OCF of Circus Circus, Inc., could be partly attributed to the low-limit opera- 
tion policy of the company. The stable and increasing OCF of the company could be a reli- 
able internal financing source for the "Luxor" project. 
The company projected that the monthly OCF duringthe 1992-1993 period from exist- 
ing properties would be $10 million to $12 million. In other words, a total of $240 million to 
$288 million of OCF was expected to be generated for the two-year period. The "Luxor" 
project was scheduled to be completed in two years. The company's expected internal OCF 
would be able to cover almost the entire project's costs, $300 millon. 
l~inancial information was obtained from the Annual Reports (1991-1994) of Circus Circus 
Enterprises, Inc., Value Line, and interviews with the company's officials in charge of investors 
relations. 
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Second, new common equity could be a source of financing. The company had 62.5 
million shares of common stocks outstanding, with 150 million shares authorized. It could 
issue more common shares. Prior to the announcement of the "Lwor" project, the com- 
pany was a favored stock on the market, traded at a price/earning (PE) ratio around 26, 
well above the S&P 500s average PE of 19. The market condition was favorable. 
Third, the company had two existing long-term notes. At the end of 1991, its long-term 
debt to total capitalization ratio (LTDTC) at book value was 50.87%, which compared fa- 
vorably with the industry's average of 65.84%. With its debt capacity greater than the aver- 
age of the industry, the company could issue new long-term debt to finance the project. Ad- 
ditionally, the company had a total of $500 million of bank revolvers, of which the company 
had used only $247 million. A credit line of $253 million was still available. The large 
amount of bank credit available to Circus Circus, Inc., was backed up by the company's 
excellent past and expected future cash flow. According to Fogarty and KiLlian (1990), one- 
half of the major insurance companies, banks, and commercial credit companies simply 
did not accept applications for financing new lodging properties during the 1990-1991 re- 
cession. However, should a loan be committed for an expansion project, the project must be 
supported by the ability to generate healthy cash flow. 
The company's decision on financing the project was to rely on internally generated 
cash flow. It also decided that in case of fund shortage, bank revolvers, which are shorter 
but less risky than long-term notes, should be used. The company decided not to issue new 
debt or equity for the "Luxor" project. As scheduled, the "Luxor" casino hotel was com- 
pleted and had its grand opening in late 1993. The actual expenditure was in line with the 
initial estimate. No additional external funds were raised for the project. In 1993, during 
the construction of another project, "Grand Slam Canyon," the company issued $150 mil- 
lion senior subordinated long-term notes, followed by another issue of $150 million deben- 
tures. Bothissues were for financing needs not related to the "Lwor" project. The company 
successfully financed the construction of "Luxor" with internally generated funds. 
The Financing of Mirage's "Treasure Island project2 
The "Treasure Island" of Mirage Resorts, Inc., a casino company whose casinos are fea- 
tured with high-limit games, is a 3,000-room pirate-themed casino hotel. The construction 
of "Treasure Island" had its debut at the beginning of 1992 and was completed in December 
1993. The total cost was initially estimated at $430 million. At the end of 1991, prior to the 
construction, the company had the following financing options. 
First, Mirage could use its internal OCF as a part of the financing for "Treasure Island." 
Table 1 shows its earnings and OCF from 1981 through 1993. The company's operation was 
2~inancial information was obtained from Mirage Resorts, Inc.' s Annual Reports 
(1991-1994), Value Line, and interviews with officials in charge of investors relations. 
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very profitable in 1991, generating $106.14 million of OCF. The company expected to generate 
a similar amount of OCF in 1992 and 1993, about $100 million per year. Since the project was 
planned to be completed in two years, internal cash flow would be well below the estimated 
capital requirement of $430 million. Besides, unlike Grcus Circus, Mirage's eamings and OCF 
had been unstable in the past (see Table 1). During the 11-year period 1981-1991, it experi- 
enced four inmases and six demases in annual OCF. In 1989, it had a negative cash flow of 
$5.38 million The high volatility of the W s  OCF implied that internal funds would be m- 
liable financing soumes for the project. In comparison with Cixus Cixus, Mirage's future 
OCF could .be instable and insufficient. External financing was needed. 
Second, Mirage could also issue new equity to finance the project. The company had 
authorized 225 million common shares, with only 47 million shares outstanding. By the 
end of 1991, Mirage's stock was traded around a PE of 40, even "hotter" than the stock 
of Circus Circus, Inc. The company could raise new equity in a favorable capital market 
environment. 
Third, Mirage, Inc., had signhcantly improved its debt capacity through its mid-1991 
debt restructuring. Issuing new long-term debt was another financing option. The compa- 
ny's LTDTC was 89.2% at the end of 1990 (see Table 2), which compared unfavorably with 
the industry's average of 72.35%. In mid-1991, prior to the announcement of the construe- 
tion of "Treasure Island," the company made two new public offerings of common stocks 
to bring down its extremely high leverage ratio. The company's LTDTC thus decreased to 
72.63% by the end of 1991, compared with the industry's average of 65.84%. The compa- 
ny's financial slack, though still below the industry's average, had been improved. 
The company's decision was to issue $300 million first mortgage notes as its primary 
method of financing the "Treasure Island" project. Internal OCF, estimated at $200 million 
for the 19921993 period, would play a less important role. The notes were collateralized 
with its three existing casino properties. The new debt was issued in 1992. As scheduled, 
the "Treasure Island" casino was completedin late 1993. The actual construction cost of the 
project was $470 million, $40 million higher than the original estimate. The OCF generated 
from existing operations in 1992 and 1993 totaled $222.1 million. The $300 million raised 
throughiss~notes ,  combined with the internal OCF, should be sufficient for the project. 
In November 1993, due to the financing needs for improvements of three existing casinos, 
the company raised another $170 million through public offering of common stbcks. 
A Comparison: Financing Theories Versus the Two Firms' Practices 
Before the two companies embarked on their new expansion projects in early 1992, 
their OCFs in the two previous years improved sigruficantly while at the same time, their 
leverage ratios dropped. Table 2 shows that the OCFs of the two companies increased 
while their LTDTC ratios decreased from 1990 to 1992. According to the TTO theory, un- 
profitable companies would rely more on equity financing, whereas profitable companies 
may want to have higher leverage to shield taxable income. The fact that the two compa- 
nies' debt leverage ratios declined as they became more profitable in terrns of OCF contra- 
dicts the TTO theory. In a longer time frame of 1981-1993, the coefficient of correlation 
Financing Theories and Financing Practices: A Case Study of Two Casino Companies 17 
between OCF and LTDTC was calculated and tested for the two companies respectively. 
The coefficient of correlation of Circus Circus was -0.16 with a P value of 0.60 and that of the 
Mirage was 4.41 with a P value of 0.17. The test of the correlation did not support a posi- 
tive relationship between profitability and use of debt either. The evidence from the two 
casino companies' financing practices confirmed Brealey and Myers' (1984) conclusion 
that the TTO theory fails to explain the real-life corporate financing behavior - profitable 
companies are often found to use less debt. 
In financing its "Luxor" project, Circus Circus, Inc., had a dear preference for its inter- 
nal cash flow, followed by external bank credit revolvers, which was shorter and less risky 
than long-term notes. New equity was not planned, nor was it issued later. In fact, issuance 
of new equity had not been considered by Circus Circus as a financing means for years. 
Relatively risky long-term notes, $150 million senior subordinated notes and $150 million 
debentures, were issued later in 1993. Both were for other financing needs. 
On the other hand, without stable and sufficient expected cash flow, Mirage, Inc., had 
to rely on external financing as its main financing source for "Treasure Island." The man- 
agement chose to use secured first mortgage notes, instead of new common equity, for the 
project. The company did issue new common stocks in early 1991 and late 1993. While the 
1991 issuance was entirely meant for debt restructuring prior to the announcement of the 
"Treasure Island" project, the 1993 issuance served two purposes: financing the improve- 
ments of existing properties and further improving the debt capacity. 
The two companies' financing decisions showed a dear financing pattern in which in- 
ternal funds were given the priority, followed by debts, such as bank revolvers, mortgage 
notes, and unsecured debentures. New equity was not issued for the projects. The financ- 
ing preference orders of the two companies seemed consistent with what is described by 
the PPO and MPO theories. 
In terms of debt financing both companies used safe debt first, which was consistent 
with the MPO theory. While Circus Circus considered bank revolvers in the first place and 
used risky notes and debentures later on for an unrelated project, Mirage issued only se- 
cured long-term mortgage notes for the project. The two companies' preference of less- 
risky debt to risky debt was obvious and was consistent with the MPO theory. 
Both companies showed their desire for maintaining or improving financial slack in 
their finanang behaviors. Circus Circus, Inc., had intended to keep the debt-to-capital ra- 
tio low and maintain a healthy financial position. Reserving debt capacity had been a 
dearly stated corporate policy. In the company's Annual Report (1991), the management 
indicated that "By design, Circus Circus is well-positioned at the low end of the industry 
leverage scale, keeping plenty of investment capacity in reserve." The sharp decline in the 
LTDTC of Mirage in recent years (see Table 2) was indicative of its pursuance of financial 
slack. The company's 1991 stock issuance, plus the retained earnings generated from its 
profitable 1991 operation, lowered the LTDTC ratio from 1990's 89.2% to 1991's 72.63%. 
After its new public offering of stocks in late 1993, Mirage's LTDTC further dropped to 
37%. The company's public offerings of stocks in 1991 and 1993 seemed consistent with the 
MPO's hypothesis that the preference for new debt to new equity can be reversed when the 
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desire for financial slack dominates. The fact that both companies pursued financial slack 
and Mirage moved back on the preference order to achieve greater debt capacity sup- 
ported the MPO theory. 
The two companies' avoidance of using new equity to finance the projects was likely 
due to possible market undervaluation. According to Ehlers (1996), there was a general be- 
lief on Wall Street during the gaming expansion that the Las Vegas Market was saturated. 
When "The Mirage," Mirage Resorts, Inc.'s first megaresort on the Las Vegas Strip, was 
opened in late 1989, the consensus held that the visitor base was not large enough to sup- 
port a new megaresort. The same belief prevailed on Wall Street when the two companies 
announced their plans for the new projects. The two companies' avoidance of new equity 
financing for the projects seemed to fit the information asymmetry hypothesis of the MPO 
theory. Using internal OCF, Circus Circus could avoid possible undervaluation caused by 
the information asymmet~. Using secured mortgage notes could enable Mirage to reduce 
such undervaluation. 
Mirage actually adopted a two-step strategy in financing "Treasure Island." Its first 
step was to issue new common equity to retire debt in early 1991. The second step was to 
issue new debt during the construction of the project. The earnings and OCF of the com- 
pany had been instable in the past (see Table 1). If common stocks had been issued to fi- 
nance the project in the first place, the security might have been well undervalued because 
of the risks involved for potential investors. The secured long-term notes, though not risk- 
free, were much safer for investors. The undervaluation associated with the issuance of the 
notes, if any, should be less than that associated with a new issuance of common stocks. The 
information asymmetry hypothesis seems to provide a reasonable explanation for Mirage, 
Inc.'s strategy. 
Conclusions 
The two casino companies' financing practices in their new expansion projects do not 
support the TTO theory. The PPO and MPO theories seem to describe the financing behav- 
iors of the two casino companies better than the TTO theory. There was an obvious prefer- 
ence order in the two companies' financing decisions of their expansion projects. Between 
the PPO and MPO theories, the evidence leaned toward the latter. 
It is inappropriate to generalize the findings from the two casino companies to the ca- 
sino industry as a whole. As the two firms analyzed in the study are two of the largest ca- 
sino companies, it is appropriate to conclude that large casino companies do have a prefer- 
ence order in financing their investment projects as suggested by the MPO theory. In 
financing a project, internally generated OCF is the most favored, followed by safe debt 
and then risky debt. New common equity is the least preferred, but can be used to achieve 
financial slack or to increase debt capacity for future debt financing. 
Financing decisions are critical to the cost of capital of the hospitality industry and the 
value of the hospitality firm. Capital structure should be an important topic in the research 
and education of hospitality finance. It certainly deserves more academic attention. Gu's 
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(1996) study found evidence supportive of the MPO theory from the hotel sector. This 
study has provided additional evidence for the MPO from large casino companies' financ- 
ing practices. However, it is still too early to conclude that the MPO is the theory that can 
best describe financing behavior in the entire hospitality industry. Future studies may 
compare the three financing theories with financing behaviors of small casino firms. Fur- 
thermore, empirical studies on the financing behavior in the restaurant industry in com- 
parison with the three existing theories are also needed. 
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Table 1 
Earnings and Operating Cash Flows of the Two Companies 
(1981-1993) 
Year Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc. Mirage Resorts, Inc. 
EPS OCFPS OCF(Mi1.) EPS OCFPS OCF(Mi1.) 
1981 $0.16 $0.23 $22.27 $0.15 $0.21 $41.48 
1982 0.19 0.28 27.11 0.14 0.24 41.08 
1983 0.23 0.31 34.77 0.22 0.33 59.20 
1984 0.28 0.42 47.10 0.05 0.17 29.25 
1985 0.33 0.49 55.25 0.13 0.32 . 49.17 
1986 0.32 0.54 61.16 0.02 0.18 31.01 
1987 0.55 0.80 90.98 0.03 0.21 23.56 
1988 0.76 1.15 104.11 -0.02 0.15 13.11 
1989 0.87 1.24 106.14 -0.33 -0.06 -5.38 
1990 1.02 1.51 124.53 0.31 1 .OO 83.46 
1991 1.23 1.78 151.12 0.40 0.95 104.36 
1992 1.41 1.92 167.60 0.26 0.67 99.90 
1993 1.34 2.02 174.30 0.29 0.67 122.20 
Note: EPS = Earnings per share. 
OCF = Operating cash flow. 
OCFPS = Operating cash flow per share. 
Source: Value Line, August 30,1996. 
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Table 2 
Operating Cash Flow and Long-Term Debt to Total Capitalization 
of the Two Companies (1981-1993) 
Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc. Mirage Resorts, Inc. 
--- - - pp 
Note: OCF = Operating cash flow. 
LTDTC = Long-term debt to total capitalization ratio. 
Source: Value Line, Augusf 30,1996. 
